Current revolutionary events in Egypt are often discussed with reference to two theses put forward by American writers. The first is Malcolm Gladwell’s recent thesis that protest requires hierarchical organization rather than networks, and the second is Francis Fukuyama’s thesis from the late 1980s that history has exhausted its possibilities and we are left with liberal democracy as the sole credible form of socio-political organization. I think, and will argue below, that the appeal of both theses in Western publics stems from a common source.
John Quiggin, a social democratic economist from Australia, stated that the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt mark the death of “Arab exceptionalism,” that is, “the idea that the concept of democracy is not really applicable in Arab countries.” So far, so good. In a follow-up piece, Quiggin poses the rhetorical question, “So, how is Fukuyama’s view of the end of history looking?” He thinks recent events largely vindicate Fukuyama’s diagnosis; “the startling events in North Africa have undercut the recently popular criticism of the Fukuyama thesis.” We really have arrived at the end of history, he concludes.
Alain Badiou, in contrast, is not so sure, as his comments in a recent lecture make clear. In his understanding, the demands made by the protesters in Egypt point beyond mere “western inclusion.” It is not determined that Egypt—or any other state experiencing popular uprisings—will simply join the ranks of tranquil liberal–democratic states making the world safe for capital. Quiggin seems to take this for granted. In Badiou’s analysis, however, we live in an “interval period” in which movements such as the ones demanding change in Tunisia “demonstrate that the capacity to create new forms of collective organisation is intact.” Badiou reportedly ended his lecture with a poem by Brecht, and it appears as though poets, such as Sinan Antoon, have a keen sense for the “new forms” that are arising.
Most western commentators, in contrast, have trouble imagining what such new forms would look like. They assume that the path Egypt will take—provided it doesn’t become an Islamist-run muddle—is inevitably towards “free and fair” elections and the establishment of formal democracy, taking us further down the road to Fukuyama’s end of history. For that same reason, commentators in the west cannot imagine a centerless, leaderless movement achieving lasting social change. Gladwell’s addendum that “people” drive social change ignores that fact that organized people are driving change—and that their organization is not centralized, horizontal or fixated on elections and capturing state power. Instead, they embody novel forms of affiliation and association that aren’t easily captured with terms like ”liberal,” ”secular,” “religious” etc.
